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n 7 November 2001, Somalis
around the world were
shocked to find that the haw-
ilaad offices they use to send
remittances to their relatives were on
the list of organisations suspected of
links with Osama Bin Laden and al-
Qa’ida. Without any warning, Al
Barakaat offices around the world
were forcibly shut down, their assets
confiscated and telecommunications
lines cut as part of the ‘global war
against terrorism’. US officials justi-
fied these measures by claiming that
tens of millions of dollars a year were
moved from Al Barakaat to al-Qa’ida
but produced little evidence to sup-
port this allegation. This article looks
into an aspect of the closure that has
been largely neglected: the conse-
quences for ordinary Somalis.
The hawilaad system
Derived from an Arabic word, hawil in
Somali means transfer — usually of
money or responsibilities. The haw-
ilaad is an informal system of value
transfer that operates in almost every
part of the world. It is run by Somalis
and mainly used by Somalis, for busi-
ness transactions and to send
remittances to relatives. It works
remarkably simply. If a Somali man in
Minneapolis or East London wants to
send money to his mother in Nairobi
or Mogadishu, he presents the amount
of money to be transferred to the
financial broker in his town, providing
full details of himself and the recipi-
ent. The financial broker then sends a
fax, telephone message or email to
the Nairobi or Mogadishu office,
where the mother will be contacted as
soon as possible. She goes personally
to the hawilaad office and has to pro-
vide the full details of the person she
thinks has sent the money, as well as
proof of her own identity. If the infor-
mation corresponds to what the
sender has given, she will receive her
money, within only a few days of it
being sent. Accounts between the dif-
ferent hawilaad offices are later
levelled out through sending cash or
through trade in consumer items,
gold or other commodities.
Most of the Somali money transfer
business is handled by three main
companies: Al Barakaat
(‘Blessings’), Dahabshil (‘Melted
Jewellery’) and Amal (‘Trust’).
Though these started to operate
in the late 1980s, the transfer system
has a long history in Somalia.
Remittances have long played an
important part in the country’s econo-
my, since a large number of Somali
nationals have emigrated elsewhere in
search of better opportunities, work,
business or education. 
Somali migration and
remittances
In the last 30 years there have been
two main forms of movement out of
Somalia, resulting in the formation of
a large and influential diaspora. From
the early 1970s, many Somalis went
as migrant labourers to work in the
Gulf States during the oil boom of
that time. Some 150,000-200,000 did
so annually in the 1970s, while by the
end of the 1980s between 200,000
and 375,000 were working in oil-rich
Gulf states. The outbreak of civil war
in 1988 and the inter-clan fighting
after the fall of Siad Barre in 1991 dis-
placed hundreds of thousands of
Somalis within the country and drove
many others to leave for Ethiopia,
Kenya, Yemen and other neighbouring
countries, as well as further afield to
the UK, Italy, the Netherlands,
Scandinavia, Canada, the US and other
Western states. While accurate num-
bers cannot be established, by 2000
there were thought to be some
300,000 displaced people within
Somalia, about 400,000 refugees in
Africa and Yemen, and more than
70,000 refugees in Western countries,
out of a total diaspora in Western
countries of perhaps 200,000.1
As the forms of Somali migration
have diversified, so too have the
sources of remittances. While figures
are only rough estimates, from the
late 1970s up to $300 million was
remitted annually, about two-fifths of
GNP. In the 1980s this rose to $370
million, with migrant workers in the
Gulf accounting for about 75%. From
the later 1980s and in the 1990s, the
wider diaspora, partly formed by
refugee outflows, accounted for a
greater proportion of remittances.
Currently about $500 million may be
remitted to Somalia annually and per-
haps the same amount to Somaliland.2
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Could there be a better way to create more hard-
ship, more instability and more potential refugees,
while increasing the appeal of extremism, than to
cut off the money transfer lifeline to Somalia by
shutting down remittance agencies?
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From the 1970s, Somali traders began
to collect hard currency from migrant
workers in the Gulf and to use it to
purchase commodities for sale in
Somalia. The equivalent in Somali cur-
rency or goods was then handed over
to the migrants’ family and kinsmen.
The first version of this was known as
the ‘franco-valuta’ system: this was
banned in 1982, partly because it cir-
cumvented the control of the Barre
regime. It was supplanted by the haw-
ilaad system, encouraged by the
collapse of Somalia’s formal economy
and the burgeoning of the informal
sector. Both systems were based on
two essential characteristics in Somali
culture: strong kinship ties and high
rate of mobility. Although family
members often move in different
directions and may thus find them-
selves far apart, they still carry a
strong responsibility to assist each
other.
Hawilaad and Somali
refugees in Kenya’s Dadaab
camps 
The hawilaad system has been of
great importance in the lives of many
Somalis, including refugees. For those
in the three camps around Dadaab in
north-eastern Kenya, survival is a
daily struggle in an arid environment.
The international community hands
out rations of maize and at times
wheat flour or beans every 15 days
but these last only about ten days.
Firewood is distributed a couple of
times a year as well but amounts are
far from sufficient. Besides, people
have other needs that are not catered 
for through handouts. It is very diffi-
cult to find additional sources of
income in the area. Those who came
with their own resources may have
been able to set up a small business.
Others have managed to bring live-
stock or have bought it in Dadaab.
Ecological constraints and insecurity
hamper agriculture. Salaried employ-
ment is largely confined to jobs
available with relief and development
agencies working in the region.
Mostly, people are involved in such
petty trade activities as weaving, bak-
ing, brewing tea, selling small
quantities of camel milk, sugar or tea
leaves or collecting firewood. Profits
are minimal and risks may be high:
when women go into the bush to col-
lect firewood, for instance, they run
the risk of being raped by shifta or
‘bandits’.3 
Receiving a monthly allowance of
$100 a month from a relative in
Toronto or Nairobi therefore makes
an immense difference to refugees in
Dadaab. Even if that person is not in a
position to send remittances on a
monthly basis, at least he or she can
be called upon in times of contin-
gency, like illness or death. Yunis
Ahmed was a refugee in his mid-for-
ties, living in Dagahaley camp. He had
worked for the agencies as teacher
and translator on a
number of short-
term assignments.
He lived in the camp with his aged
mother, close to the house where his
brother stayed with his wife. The
brother was having mental problems
that were aggravated to the point
where he became a danger to his wife,
threatening to kill her. Yunis tried to
do whatever was in his power, even
giving up his teaching position; he
went to the local hospital for assis-
tance but was told that they could do
nothing for his brother. When matters
got out of hand, he contacted a cousin
in Nairobi who passed the message to
their relatives in different places
around the world, collecting $100
from one family, 3,000 Kenyan
shillings from another, and so on.
Eventually, he was able to send a total
amount of $600, which Yunis used to
take his brother to Nairobi for treat-
ment.
Beneficiaries and benefits
The majority of the refugees are not
as fortunate as Yunis, having no rela-
tives to assist them when they need it.
However, even though the proportion
of refugees who do receive remit-
tances may only be 10-15%, others
benefit indirectly from the existence
of the hawilaad in the camps. Those
who receive a regular or occasional
amount mostly share this with others;
money enters the camp economy,
which benefits shopkeepers and busi-
nessmen; and those who can afford it
occasionally employ others as domes-
tic workers or for construction work.
Thus, even the poorer segments of
the population may eventually benefit
from the hawilaad system. 
Habibo Omar, a woman from the
Bantu minority in her late thirties,
learned through a radio conversation
with her brother in Kismayo, with
whom her disabled daughter was stay-
ing, that the security situation was
worsening there. She borrowed 1,000
Kenyan shillings in the market, giving
her ration card number as security,
then travelled to Mombasa to find
work as a maid. A Somali woman
employed her and after one month
Habibo was able to send back the
1,000 shillings she borrowed. Another
three months later, she had saved
enough money to send to Kismayo to
urge her brother to come to the
refugee camp with her disabled
daughter.
Among the many advantages of the
hawilaad are that the system is much
faster and cheaper than conventional
ways of transferring money. Besides,
in many instances these conventional
means cannot be used — for example,
when sending money from Dadaab to
anywhere in Somalia. The system is rel-
atively safe in a rather insecure area,
since travellers do not need to carry
their money but can simply transfer it
to their place of destination. 
Beyond helping Somalis to survive,
the remittances transferred give peo-
ple a choice. The money can be
invested in business, or used to assist
others or for children’s education.
The recipient can decide to use it to
move: away from insecure areas,
towards economic opportunities,
towards a better life or family mem-
bers, elsewhere in the world. These
resources give refugees in difficult
conditions the capacity to assist
themselves. This capacity has been
greatly undermined by the closure of
Al Barakaat. 
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the remittances transferred give people a choice
Remittances, terrorism and
refugee livelihoods 
A few years ago, the Ministry of
Justice in the Netherlands carried out
a study on informal value transfer
systems (IVTS) and criminal organisa-
tions.4 The conclusions are highly
relevant for the closure of the haw-
ilaad: "IVTS are by no means infested
or controlled by criminals, but rather
they are one of numerous alternatives
available to criminal organisations.
Many others resort to IVTS simply to
transfer money to their relatives
because they follow cultural traditions
or services are faster, cheaper, less
bureaucratic and more convenient
than any other alternative. Before
implementing drastic measures
against IVTS, more solid evidence of
negative consequences is required.
The legislative arsenal in the West can
adequately deal with those who have
committed crimes, and Western gov-
ernments have already attempted to
render IVTS more transparent by
requiring them to get a license and
report unusual transactions of certain
magnitude. After all, criminals are the
main problem, not the way they move
their money." 
Terrorist networks may well have
used the hawilaad system, as have
Somali warlords buying weapons and
sponsoring war, but, as UN agencies
and others in Somalia have attested,
the system is mainly used by ordinary
Somalis, including refugees, with no
such connections. 
Life in the Horn of Africa is often life
on the margins, and assistance from
outside is needed for survival. The
Somali economy as a whole, and
Somali refugees in particular, are
highly dependent on remittances.
Urban households, including those in
refugee camps, are the main beneficia-
ries of remittances, which may
account for between 20 and 60% of
household income. While there is an
urban bias, some remittances are
redistributed among people in rural
areas.
About $60 million was injected into
the Somali economy in 2000 through
international aid (EIU 2001). In con-
trast, between $200 million and $500
million may have been transferred to
Somalia through the hawilaad system,
and these funds reach many more
people than does international aid.
There are other hawilaad companies
still operating, and new telecommuni-
cations and internet companies are
emerging, but none of them has the
reach of Al Barakaat; besides, many of
them depend on infrastructure owned
by Al Barakaat. Alternatives might be
found but would probably involve
higher costs and risks. The refugees
in the Dadaab camps in Kenya are
among those who will end up paying
the highest price of the measures
taken against the hawilaad in the
name of the ‘war against terrorism’.
Cindy Horst is a PhD candidate at
the Research Institute for Global
Issues and Development Studies,
University of Amsterdam. UNHCR
Working Paper 38 (available
online at www.jha.ac/articles/
u038.pdf) has further details of
her research in Dadaab. 
Email: C.Horst@inter.NL.net 
Nick Van Hear is a Senior
Researcher at the Centre for
Development Research,
Copenhagen, Denmark. 
Email: nvh@cdr.dk
1.  UNHCR The State of the World’s Refugees. 2000,
Oxford: OUP; US Committee for Refugees The
World Refugee Survey 2000, Washington DC: USCR;
J Gundel The migration-development nexus:
Somalia, 2002. Copenhagen: Centre for
Development Research working paper.
2.  L Ahmed ‘Remittances and their impact in post-
war Somaliland’, Disasters, 2000, 24, 2, pp380-389;
Economist Intelligence Unit. Country Report:
Somalia, 2001, EIU: London. Gundel is also a
source on remittances.
3.  For further information about life in Dadaab,
see J Musau Protecting refugees in Dadaab:
processes, problems and prospects, FMR11, pp34-
36.
4.  N Passas Informal Value Transfer Systems and
Criminal Organisations. A study into so-called
underground banking networks. Onderzoeks -
notities 1999/4. Ministerie van Justitie, Den Haag.
34 Counting the cost: refugees, remittances and the ‘war’ against terrorism FMR 14
Ex
ile
 Im
ag
es
/R
 C
h
al
as
an
i
